arguments, I think that a more powerful contribution to JWT theory, which nonetheless still furthers his arguments, would be the elaboration of a different proposal, which I would call *jus ad pacum,* or justice toward peace, or the pursuit of a just peace. I think *jus potentia ad bellum* still leaves us in the grip of justifications and rationalizations for war.

War is not simply the absence of peace. War is also preparing for war, and building a whole societal infrastructure around the weapons of war. Preparing for war is a way to wage war on a nation's people by depriving them of the resources that would enhance their standard of living for the sake of having the most powerful military on the planet. In the United States many in fact have used some of the arguments developed by van der Linden to justify the country's enormous and unjustifiable military budget and apparatus. As an "indispensable country" and "benevolent superpower," with its perceived manifest destiny, it claims to have a need for the largest military in the world to secure "global peace," and "peace for democracy."

Many of the contributors to this wonderful book critically revisit these and similar arguments. For this reason, I feel that it is of the greatest importance that JWT be expanded to include a more basic, and, I would argue, antecedent, pillar: justice toward peace *(jus ad pacum).* In other words, there cannot be, nor should there be, a just, moral, and rational justification for war (engaging in it, conducting it, and bringing it to a just end) unless nations have been operating under the imperative to pursue peace justly. There is indeed an "unjust peace," which is merely a breeding ground for future wars. Unjust peace is the kind of peace that results when one nation has unassailable power while most others are defenseless. This circumstance only fosters international mistrust, imbalance, noncooperation, and above all unaccountability. Philosophy's ideal contribution to peace would be to provide us with better and more powerful, persuasive, and humane arguments with which to pursue a just peace, and to escape the circle of violence and the endless preparations for it.

In short, this is an excellent book that can be used in many types of courses and seminars, especially those that deal with peace and war. With seventeen essays, there is an ample supply of selections to choose from. My only complaint is that this book may be too expensive to use as a textbook and that a paperback edition is not available. Nonetheless any good public or academic library should have this volume, if only to encourage American readers that they must ever be aware of the ways in which their politicians make use of the mightiest army in human history.

Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction: The Nyāya Viewpoint. By Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010. Pp. xv + 311. Hardcover $85.00.

Reviewed by **Paul J. Williams** University of Texas, Austin

The problem of induction has been among the most fiercely debated issues in philosophy for a remarkably long time. Though it is generally thought that David Hume was the first to articulate this concern, in *Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction,*

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Kisor Chakrabarti explains that the question of whether inductive reasoning can result in knowledge *(pramā)* has been debated in South Asia for approximately two thousand years, accompanied by a vast corpus of Sanskrit philosophical literature. This problem was taken up by philosophers from several of the classical Indian traditions beginning with the skeptical position of the Cārvāka school. Chakrabarti's book explores a wide range of views from Indian and Western philosophers, while focusing on a defense of induction drawn primarily from the work of the great Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa.

The urgency of the problem for Nyāya epistemology is brought into view at the outset of the book with Cārvāka arguments against the very possibility that inductive reasoning can lead to knowledge. Chakrabarti cites a series of influential rejoinders from several of the classical Indian philosophical traditions, and briefly explores the positions of Western philosophers such as Carnap, Popper, Reichenbach, Russell, and Strawson on the problem of induction. Finally, Chakrabarti argues that Gaṅgeśa's approach to justifying knowledge born of induction can solve the problems of induction both old and new.

One of the primary virtues of this book is its thoughtful organization. A distillation of Gaṅgeśa's view on induction and Chakrabarti's positive proposal are on the table by the end of the second chapter. The remainder of the text consists of translations from the works of Gaṅgeśa, Prabhacandra, Śrīharṣa, and Dharmakīrti, along with a running commentary by Chakrabarti. As a result, this volume is accessible to those unfamiliar with classical Indian epistemology *(pramāṇa-śāstra)* and will be a tremendous resource to specialists and nonspecialists alike.

Be that as it may, the text is brimming with the specialized language of classical Indian epistemology. Fortunately, Chakrabarti explains the terminology well and keeps his translations consistent throughout. According to the mainstream Nyāya view, to draw an inference *(anumāna)* is to "grasp a pervasion" *(vyāpti-graha)* between class characteristics. For example, when one observes smokiness (the "mark" or *hetu*) on a hill (the "inferential subject" or *pakṣa*) and correctly infers that there is fieriness (the "probandum" or *sādhya*) on the hill, the agent does so by virtue of recognizing that smokiness is pervaded by fieriness. In other words, all loci of the former are loci of the latter. Terminology such as this facilitates valuable distinctions and helps to frame the philosophical terrain.

Chakrabarti presents the following Cārvāka arguments against induction, and thus against inference *(anumāna),* as a source of knowledge *(pramāṇa)* as classically conceived. First, in the past when we have taken there to be a pervasion between two class characteristics, in some cases the probandum has later been found to deviate from the mark. A classic example is the inference that iron (the mark) is pervaded by the property of not being scratchable (the probandum), disproved by the discovery that iron can be scratched by a diamond. Thus, the Cārvāka conclude, we cannot possess knowledge that two phenomena will always occur together in the future simply because we have never observed them deviate in the past (p. 4). Second, because it is always possible that there is another factor—an "adjunct" *(upādhi)*—which occurs invariably with the probandum but deviates from the mark, knowledge pro-

duced by inductive reasoning is unattainable. For example, fieriness (the mark) is not pervaded by smokiness (the probandum) because the adjunct of wet fuel is needed for the existence of smoke, but is unnecessary for the existence of fire. Fire may occur without smoke when there is absence of the adjunct of wet fuel, as in molten metal (p. 5). Chapters 6 through 8 provide a very helpful discussion of the complicated issue of the nature of adjuncts.

Chakrabarti argues that the principal strength of Gaṅgeśa's view lies in its multifaceted approach to the problem (p. 68). Among Gaṅgeśa's various methods of justifying knowledge born of induction, Chakrabarti focuses primarily on two: (1) counterfactual reasoning *(tarka),* and (2) belief-behavior conflict *(pravṛtti-sāmarthya).* The primary aim of these justificatory means is to remove doubt that a cognition *(jñāna)* brought about by inductive reasoning is an instance of knowledge, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the agent's opponent. According to mainstream Nyāya thought, inferential knowledge is defeasible: it is always possible that what appears to be knowledge on one occasion will need to be revised should conflicting information become available (p. 42). Thus is revealed the distinctly social, or dialectical, nature of the Nyāya account of knowledge.

The method of "counterfactual reasoning," or "CR," is as follows. An agent asserts her opponent's view as a premise—a premise that the agent takes to be false—and draws a conclusion rejected by both sides. The purpose is to demonstrate that the opponent's view leads to a consequence both parties consider to be undesirable *(aniṣṭa-prasañga).* Gaṅgeśa takes failing to accept a factual claim for which we have observational support to be one such undesirable consequence. Chakrabarti argues that Gaṅgeśa takes this to be undesirable because he implicitly endorses the "general empiricist principle" of the "reliability of particular observations" (p. 36), to which the Cārvāka skeptic is also committed. He refers to this as the "principle of observational credibility" (p. 36). Moreover, Chakrabarti suggests that CR exemplifies Gaṅgeśa's empiricist account of knowledge, which assigns a primary role to perception *(pratyakṣa),* while reserving an indispensable place for mental reflection *(mānasa-jñāna)* in the justification of knowledge (pp. 37–40).

The following is a classic example of CR developed by Gaṅgeśa: "If smoke were produced neither by an aggregate including fire nor by an aggregate excluding fire, it would not have been produced" (p. 35). If we assume that it is accepted by both sides that smoke is produced, it follows that it is not the case that the particular instance of smoke is produced neither by an aggregate including fire nor by an aggregate excluding fire. So, the smoke must be produced by one of the two aggregates, and since there is reason to think that the smoke is produced by the aggregate for which we have observational evidence, we ought to conclude that the smoke is produced by the aggregate including fire. Thus, through the use of CR, the defender of induction shows that the opponent's view leads to the undesirable consequence of conflicting with the principle of observational credibility, thus removing doubt and shifting the burden of proof (p. 36).

Another undesirable consequence that plays an important role in Gaṅgeśa's account is the relative "complexity" *(gaurava)* of a given view. In any instance of two

or more competing hypotheses, one has reason, *ceteris paribus,* to accept the simplest among them. Chakrabarti refers to this as the "principle of economy" *(lāghava)* (p. 49). This principle plays an important role in building Chakrabarti's case for the relevance of Gaṅgeśa's view to contemporary epistemology, as we will see shortly.

Second, there is the argument from belief-behavior conflict. Though during moments of philosophical reflection one may doubt whether an inductive inference has resulted in knowledge, by virtue of behavioral evidence Gaṅgeśa argues that it is clear such doubt does not occur at the time that one performs a relevant action. Even the skeptic does not hesitate to find and extinguish the fire when smoke is observed in her home, and she simply would not perform this action if she were to doubt the truth of the relevant induction. If she did, her behavior would be different. The purpose of this argument is to show that such doubt is merely theoretical (pp. 57–60). Though the significance of this is difficult to miss, the lingering problem of theoretical doubt should not be overlooked. Unless such doubt was not a problem to begin with, it is not at all clear that the problem of theoretical doubt has been resolved. However, since it is doubt concerning the epistemic status of a particular cognition that is at issue, it is no small point that even the skeptic does not entertain such doubt at the time she performs a relevant action. Nevertheless, one cannot help but wonder whether behavioral evidence is really enough to go on in this context, and thus whether this sort of doubt in action truly never occurs. But, even so, it seems that if we go ahead and assume that there are in fact instances of such doubt, however rare they might be, the argument from belief-behavior conflict remains compelling because, at the very least, it shows that this sort of doubt is extremely unlikely to occur.

Of the two primary justificatory means considered, the significance of CR appears to be somewhat overstated. Though it is certainly not without philosophical merit, CR looks to be no more than a formal method of demonstrating how principles such as observational credibility and economy favor one position over another. Though CR may be an effective dialectical strategy (particularly in the context of the Nyāya account of knowledge), these principles, along with the argument from belief-behavior conflict, appear to do the bulk of the work in Chakrabarti's account. For example, chapter 4, "Counterfactual Reasoning: *Tarka,*" devotes a great deal of space to the argument from belief-behavior conflict, which, though an instance of *tarka,* need not be made counterfactually to achieve its end.

This last point draws attention to the inadequacy of translating *tarka* as "counterfactual reasoning." Admittedly, it is a notoriously difficult term to translate, but "CR" is simply too narrow to capture many of the varieties of reasoning generally considered to be instances of *tarka.* Consider the principle of economy mentioned above. Though Gaṅgeśa uses it in conjunction with CR, economy, much like belief-behavior conflict, does not inherently involve CR. Thus, even if we consider only those varieties of *tarka* relevant to the problem of induction, "counterfactual reasoning" is still too narrow a translation and as a result is somewhat misleading. Perhaps the term ought to be explained and left untranslated.

Of particular relevance to contemporary epistemology, Chakrabarti discusses Gaṅgeśa's attempt to solve a problem very similar to Nelson Goodman's famous

"grue paradox." Gaṅgeśa imagines a property whose existence, taken along with a reliable induction, entails a contradiction. The imagined property is "not being either the inferential subject or a negative instance" *(pakṣa-vipakṣa-anyatara-anyaḥ),* or "disni," as Chakrabarti refers to it (p. 72). The problem is illustrated by the following example. Each reliably known locus of fieriness (the probandum) together with smokiness (the mark) is a "positive instance" *(sapakṣa),* and is, by definition, a locus of disni. This is because it is neither the inferential subject *(pakṣa)* nor a negative instance *(vipakṣa),* that is, where it is reliably known that there is absence of both the mark and the probandum. Thus, fieriness is pervaded by disni. The problem is that if fieriness is pervaded by disni, and the inferential subject (e.g., the hill) is, by definition, not a locus of disni, then the hill cannot be a locus of fieriness. But this conflicts with the inference that there is fire on the hill, given (1) the reliable induction that where there is smoke there is fire, and (2) the observation of smoke on the hill. Thus, we have arrived at a contradiction.

Chakrabarti discusses several of Gaṅgeśa's attempts to solve this problem including an appeal to the principle of economy. Drawing on the latter, Chakrabarti argues that the predicates 'disni' and 'grue' ought to be rejected by virtue of being more complex than their competitors (i.e., 'fiery' and 'green'). Employing the language of David Sanford's remarkably similar analysis of 'grue,' Chakrabarti explains Gaṅgeśa's argument in the following way. The term 'disni' is undesirably complex due to its "semantically disjunctive" nature. Whereas 'disni' "includes a disjunction of semantically disconnected terms like the hill and where absence of the probandum is known" (p. 80), 'fiery' is not a semantically disjunctive property at all. Similarly, 'grue' includes both a color term and a temporal term, whereas 'green' includes only a color term. Thus, by appealing to the principle of economy, Chakrabarti argues that there is reason to reject the predicates 'disni' and 'grue' by virtue of their semantically disjunctive nature (p. 80). This is an impressive moment in the book as it exemplifies much of what Chakrabarti has set out to accomplish. First, it includes an analysis of the complexity of the imagined predicates that provides a compelling reason to consider this complexity undesirable. Second, it is historically significant that Gaṅgeśa explored these idiosyncratic philosophical ideas that bear such a striking resemblance to those of Goodman and Sanford. Third, this argument is particularly strong in the context of the Nyāya account of knowledge as it is easily applied in conjunction with CR to show that the opposing view results in the undesirable consequence of being the more complex of the two, thereby removing doubt and shifting the burden of proof. Finally, as a result, it nicely demonstrates the appeal of the Nyāya account of knowledge to contemporary epistemological concerns.

There is, however, no shortage of such creative and compelling arguments explored in this book. Among those not discussed in this review are the Nyāya accounts of causality and argumentative circularity, Gaṅgeśa's view of universal-based extraordinary perception *(sāmānya-lakṣana-pratyakṣa),* and Dharmakīrti's analysis of nonperception *(anupalabdhi)* in inferential knowledge, to name only a few. Considering the number of such complex positions canvassed, Chakrabarti deserves much praise for producing an accessible yet rigorous text while avoiding the pitfalls of

superficial approximation and unmanageable comprehensiveness. He does an impressive job explicating Gaṅgeśa's account in language familiar to students of analytic philosophy, and makes a strong case for the relevance of Nyāya views to analytic epistemology and logic. *Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction* is a tremendous resource from which students of Western and Indian philosophy alike have much to learn.

Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. By the Cowherds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 251. $35.00.

Reviewed by **Jeremy E. Henkel** Wofford College

Collaboratively written by some of the world's foremost experts in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy,[1] *Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy* is an unusual book. It stands somewhere between being a collection of essays and being a single monograph. The authors refer to it as a "polygraph" to acknowledge both their mutual influence on each other and the interrelatedness of the chapters; nevertheless, each chapter is independent enough to stand on its own as a separate article. The central theme of *Moonshadows* is the notion of conventional truth, particularly as it is elaborated in Madhyamaka. The book is not a historical exegesis, however; it is an attempt—and a successful one at that—to engage with the Buddhist notion of conventional truth not only on its own terms, but also from the perspective of contemporary Western epistemological discussions.

The first chapter contains an introduction to the notion of the "two truths" in Buddhism and the role that conventional truth plays in Buddhist philosophy as well as a summary of the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 addresses the issue of how a truth that is distorting, misleading, and ultimately to be abandoned—as conventional truth is taken to be—can properly be considered a "truth" at all. The authors argue that there is something legitimate here, that "conventionally true" is not just a roundabout way of saying "false."

Chapters 3 and 4 deal specifically with the epistemology of conventional truth, including what the legitimate epistemic instruments (*pramāṇa* in Sanskrit, *tshad ma* in Tibetan) are. Chapter 3 focuses on Candrakīrti's divergence from the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti analysis of the *pramāṇa*s, and chapter 4 looks more closely at Tsongkhapa's development of Candrakīrti's analysis. Together, the chapters address concerns about how the grasping of what is only conventionally true can be considered knowledge, and how something can be said to exist (even if only conventionally) if analysis reveals it to be ultimately empty or non-existent.

Chapter 5 examines Tsongkhapa's and Gorampa's competing interpretations of what we should take Nāgārjuna's emptiness to be a denial of—the supposed intrinsic natures of objects, or the objects themselves. Chapters 6 and 7 explore the affinities between Madhyamaka and classical Western (both Academic and Pyrrhonian) skepticism. In chapter 8 the authors argue that, at least with regard to conventional truth,